This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

890
L352
f

UC-NRLF
$B 257 788

FIRST OUTLINES OF LOGIC
APPLIED TO
GRAMMAR AND ETYMOLOGY

YA 00304

ENGLISH SCHOOL BOOKS, PUBLISH

DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUES OF WORKS
r the Use of Schools and Colleges, and of Chemical, Lit
and Scientific Works,
UBLISHED BY TAYLOR, WALTON & MABE
MAY BE HAD ON APPLICATION TO THE PUBLISHERS, OR WILL BE S

6778.

Jniversity of California.

FROM THE LIBRARY OF

DR. FRANCIS LIEBER,

rofessor of History and Law in Columbia College, New York.

THE GIFT OF

MICHAEL REESE,

Of San Francisco.

1873.

L 870
375
2
f

ists are instructive, as exhibiting the proportions in which our lan
s indebted to the various dialects to which it owes its origin.
Vocabularies begin with the shortest words and increase progressiv
lifficulty. They are also subdivided into the different parts of s
n order that, while the foundation of correct orthography and ort
s laid in the mind, the first notions of grammar may be con
vithout additional effort.

The reading lessons are so contrived as to blend the amusement
priate to childhood with solid instruction. They consist of
naxims, religious and moral extracts, and descriptions of a
accompanied by pictures.

First English Reader. By the Rev. G. D. Abbott. 12*mo.*
Illustrations. 1*s.* 9*d.*

This is intended to succeed the spelling-book, and consists of prog
essons in prose and verse, in a familiar style calculated
attention of children. They are chiefly narrative
conduct is held forth either as an example

ellished with woodcuts, and was written with a view of affording in-
tion and entertainment to children of both sexes, at home as well as
e school-room.

is recommended that after each lesson can be read by the scholar
fluency and precision, he should be required to spell some of the
s without the aid of the book, and define them by using more
le words of his own. This exercise, if judiciously varied by the
ter, cannot fail in conferring on the learner the invaluable habit of
t passing a word without paying attention to its spelling and meaning.

---

nd English Reader. By the Rev. G. D. Abbott. 12*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

Author was guided in making this selection of Prose and Poetry, by
consideration that if the mind and heart are rightly trained, the
ance of the voice will unfailingly give the proper emphasis, cadence,
inflection, and every grace of speech, which can add expression and
to sentiments and feelings. Hence, after the elements are acquired,
great object should be, to present to the young reader lessons of such
est as to secure his attention and enlist his feelings; and unless bad
s have been formed and confirmed, the pupil will read, with proper
and inflections, what he understands and feels.

his selection, accordingly, has in view pure and elevating moral in-
ces, as well as attractive reading. The articles, which exceed a
red in number, range through a considerable variety of styles and
cts. Many of them relate to religion, virtue, and practical wisdom;
hese topics are diversified by the copious intermixture of dialogues,
ories, descriptions, and narratives of a more lively cast.

---

lish Grammar for the Use of Schools. By Dr. R. G. Latham, F.R.S. New Edition. 12*mo.* 4*s.* 6*d. cloth.*

bject of this work is to lay down the principles of English Gram-
s distinguished from mere rules. The student in the middle and
r classes of schools, for whom the work is chiefly intended, is made
inted with the connexion of the various branches of the great
ic stock of langnages; and, by learning the history of his own
e, and its relations to the dialects with which it is connected,
res the elements of the general philological classification of lan-
s. The book presents him with new and numerous facts, and
ates him to reasoning upon them; and while the work can be
y mastered, independently of any knowledge of either of the
al languages, as much logic is given as is necessary to explain the
ure of propositions.

---

ry and Etymology of the English Language, for the Use of Classical Schools. By Dr. R. G. Latham, F.R.S. *Fcap.* 8*vo.* 1*s.* 6*d., cloth.*

s an introductory grammar, intended for those desirous of study-
e English language with reference to the history, the transitions,
e analogies of its forms.

FIRST OUTLINES OF LOGIC,

APPLIED TO

Grammar and Etymology.

By R. G. LATHAM, M.D.

FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
AUTHOR OF "THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE," "AN ENGLISH GRAMMAR," ETC.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR TAYLOR AND WALTON,
PUBLISHERS AND BOOKSELLERS TO UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
UPPER GOWER-STREET.
1847.

PREFACE.

The present Treatise is limited to the exhibition of those points of Grammar which the construction of a single preposition is capable of explaining. These are the general nature of the Parts of Speech, and two sorts of Inflections. A wider latitude would have interfered with the intended brevity of the work. It presupposes on the part of the reader an average knowledge of the current terms and rules of the usual Grammars.

29, Upper Southwick Street,
May 1847.

OUTLINES OF LOGIC.

§ 1. General *view of Propositions.*—The first step in Grammatical Logic is to understand the nature of *Propositions.*

To do this, let us suppose two men talking together.

It is certain that they talk about something,—*e. g. the weather.*

It is also certain that they say something about something; *e. g.* they say of the weather *that it is hot,* or *that it is not hot.*

One may assert that it is *hot.* In this case the subject spoken of is *the weather,* concerning which there is a fact affirmed, *viz.* that *it is hot.*

The other may assert that it is *not hot;* in which case the subject spoken of is *the weather,* concerning which a fact is *denied, viz.* the fact of its being *hot.*

Now, the words by which we make either the statement that the *weather is hot,* or the statement that *the weather is not hot,* form what is called by logicians and grammarians a Proposition.

§ 2. *The Proportion that Propositions bear to language in general.*—If we consider the great extent to which statements concerning particular objects, or classes of objects, form the staple of human conversation, if we remember how much of our speech is applied to making

different assertions concerning different subjects, and if we convince ourselves of the degrees in which we are continually either affirming or denying something of something, we shall perceive the great proportion which that part of our language which takes the form of a proposition bears to that which does not do so.

§ 3. *Parts of Speech, and the Tests by which they are determined.*—No one can look into a grammar without finding an enumeration of what are called the *Parts of Speech, e. g.* the Noun, the Verb, the Substantive, the Adjective, the Participle, the Conjunction, the Interjection, &c.

Now, the parts of speech are determined by the structure of propositions; and a word is a noun, a conjunction, or a verb, according to either the place it takes in a proposition, or the relation it bears to one.

Obs.—The Grammatical form of a word is an insufficient test. No substantive, in the etymological signification of the term, ends in *-ειν* in Greek; whilst infinitive verbs, generally speaking, do so end. Nevertheless, the infinitive forms *τὸ φθονεῖν, ἐν τῷ φθονεῖν,* are not verbs, but substantives. For the purposes of *Syntax,* at least, the logical test as opposed to the etymological test is indispensable.

Neither is the Phonetic form (*i. e.* the sound) of a word a test. The same combination of sounds may have a variety of meanings, and may sometimes constitute one part of speech, sometimes another. The word *up* is an adverb in the sentence *I go up in a balloon;* a preposition in the sentence *I go up a tree.*

The laws by which one meaning grows out of another belong to the highest branches of Philology, and are

questions in what has been called the Natural History of Language.

§ 4. *Parts of Speech that enter into the structure of Propositions.*—From the propositions already quoted (*the weather is hot* and *the weather is not hot*) it is evident that the word *weather* belongs to one of those parts of speech that enter into the structure of propositions. If it were not so, it would not appear as it does.

The same applies to the word *is*.

The same to the word *hot*.

The same to the word *not*.

Each and all of these words, however much they may differ in other respects, agree in the fact of their being admissible into the structure of propositions.

§ 5. *Parts of Speech that do not enter into the structure of Propositions.*—Take the words *ah! oh! pish!* or any of the words usually called interjections. They will not combine with other words so as to form sense. They will neither make a proposition by themselves, nor help to make one in conjunction with other words. The person who uses them, uses them as he would use a gesture, to express surprise, pain, or contempt; but although he uses them thus he makes no *affirmation*. He no more affirms that *he is surprised*, or that *he is in pain*, or that *he is scornful*, than if he started back, or laid his hand upon a tender part of his body, or curled his lip contemptuously; and in like manner the hearer understands his meaning. But he would have understood a gesture as well. Nothing is affirmed or denied by the words. Neither do they enter into propositions wherein anything is affirmed or denied. They are wholly independent of propositions; as much so

as the hiss of a snake, or the groan of a wounded animal, —expressions of which we *infer* the meaning, but expressions as to the meaning whereof we are not informed in the way that we are informed by propositions.

This shews that they are certain parts of speech that do not enter into the construction of propositions.

§ 6. *The First sort of Parts of Speech which do not enter into the construction of Propositions.*—This has been already exemplified. The words quoted, and the like of them, form the first class of words which do not enter into the construction of propositions. They not only do not enter at all into the construction of propositions, but are wholly independent of them. If no propositions existed, such words would still exist.

7. *The Second sort of Words which do not enter into the construction of Propositions.* — There are certain words which without entering into the construction, are yet dependent for their presence in language upon the existence of propositions. This is readily conceivable, and words may exist which shall *connect* two propositions, and yet form a part of neither. Such a word is *because*.

The day is fine is one proposition.

The sun is bright is another proposition.

The day is fine, because *the sun is bright*, is a pair of propositions connected by the word *because:* the word *because* itself belongs to neither.

This class of words, and the class alluded to immediately before it, will be again alluded to. At present they are mentioned solely for the sake of shewing that it is not every word, nor every part of speech, that enters into the construction of propositions.

Two classes of words do not so enter. One is wholly independent of propositions at all. The other presupposes not only one proposition, but two; which two it connects.

Now, when it is remembered that there are only two classes of words (neither class numerous) that do *not* enter into the construction of propositions, additional proof will be given to the greatness of the extent to which propositions form the staple of human speech.

§ 8. *Details of the structure of Propositions.* — The common definition of a proposition is *discourse, in which something is affirmed or denied of something.* There are other definitions, but this is sufficient for the present purpose, which is, mainly, to shew into how many parts a proposition is divided.

In the first place, there are two *somethings*—the *something* spoken *about*, and the *something* said concerning it. Thus, in the proposition *man is mortal*, the quality, property, or attribute expressed by the word *mortal* is affirmed concerning the being *man;* so that *man* is one part of the proposition, *mortal* another.

Again,—in the proposition *ice is not hot*, the property, quality, or attribute expressed by the word *hot* is denied of *ice*. *Ice*, therefore, is one part of the proposition, *hot* another.

Summer is pleasant,
Winter is cold,
Life is short,
Iron is useful,
Bread is cheap;
or,
Summer is *not* pleasant,

Winter is *not* cold,
Life is *not* short,
Iron is *not* useful,
Bread is *not* cheap,

are all examples of the same kind.

There must be something, the name of which answers to the question *What are you talking about?*

And when that is answered, there must also be another something the name of which answers to the question *What do you say about it?*

Thus,—

Q. *What do you talk about?*

A. *The weather.*

Q. *What did you say about it?*

A. *That it was hot.*

or,

A. *That it was not hot.*

To say *summer is, winter is, life is,* &c., is to combine words to no purpose. The combination conveys no meaning.

To say *is pleasant, is cold, is short,* &c., is also to combine words to no purpose. The combination conveys no meaning.

But, farther, to say *summer—pleasant, winter—cold, life—short,* is to combine words to no purpose. The combination conveys no meaning. This shews that there are *three* parts in a proposition.

Each of the above-mentioned expressions is imperfect, and it may be seen how it is imperfect.

In the expression *summer is,* we have the name (*summer*) denoting the object concerning which we affirm something; and we have also the word denoting

the existence of an affirmation (*is*). What, however, that affirmation *is*, is unexplained.

In the expression *is pleasant* we find what was wanted in the previous one, *viz.* an affirmation concerning something. The name, however, of this *something* is unexplained.

Lastly, in the expression *summer—pleasant*, although we find both the name of an object (*summer*), and the name of a property, quality, or attribute (*pleasant*), we find no word or sign by which we can tell whether this property, quality, or attribute of *pleasantness* belongs or does not belong to summer; in other words, there is nothing to shew whether the fact expressed by the word *pleasant* is denied or affirmed of the word *summer*.

Hence, every proposition consists of three parts:—

i. *The Subject.*—The something concerning which we make a statement, whether in the way of affirmation or denial, or the subject of our discourse is called the Subject; so that the subject is the word denoting the person or thing concerning which something is affirmed or denied. *Man, summer, winter*, &c., are subjects, and we can assert of them that they are *mortal, pleasant, cold*, &c.; or else that they are not so, *i. e.* that they are *not mortal, not pleasant, not cold*, &c. In the first case the proposition is affirmative, in the second negative.

ii. *The Predicate.*—The name of the notion connected with the subject of our discourse, is called the Predicate. *Mortal, warm, cold*, are predicates.

iii. *The Copula.*—That part of a proposition which connects the subject and predicate is called the Copula; and it is the word which serves as a sign to

denote the existence of either an affirmation or a denial, and to shew which of the two it is. In the previous examples the word *is* forms the affirmative, the words *is not* form the negative copulæ.

Obs.—A few sentences back, the words *in the first place, there are two somethings*, &c., occur. At that stage of the explanation we had not gone further than the consideration of the subject and the predicate. As we proceeded, it was shewn that a third element, the copula, was essential to the structure of a proposition. A quotation from Mill's "System of Logic" may serve to illustrate both the character of the copula, and to prepare the reader for an important distinction which will be indicated in § 11. "A proposition, we have before said, is a portion of discourse in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. A predicate and a subject are all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition: but, as we cannot conclude, from merely seeing two names put together, that they are a predicate and a subject, *i. e.* that one of them is intended to be affirmed or denied of the other, it is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention—some sign to distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse. This is sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an *inflection*, as when we say *fire burns;* but this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word *is*, when an affirmation is intended, *is not*, when a negation. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called the Copula."—Vol. i. p. 103.

Note.—Observe the expression *fire burns*. *Fire* is the subject; the idea expressed by the sounds *b, u, r, n,*

is the predicate. The full expression, FIRE IS BURNING, in the simplest form of language, would be *fire is burn;* wherein *is*, the copula, would appear as a separate word. In the proposition, however, as it stands, (*fire burns*) we have instead of the copula as a separate word, a modification (*i. e.* the addition of *s*) of the form of the predicate. Substitutions of this sort are of the highest importance in grammar.

Obs.—Interrogative propositions form no exceptions to the statement, that all propositions contain either an affirmation or a denial. A question is reducible to an assertion. In the expression *what is this,* the word *what* is the predicate. Its meaning is *something concerning which I want information.* Its place is at the beginning of the proposition, instead of the end. The logical sense of the sentence is *this* (*is*) *something unknown requiring explanation.*

The transposition of the subject and predicate in interrogations is a practice of language, common but not universal.

Obs.—The nature of *commands* is more doubtful than that of interrogations. The words *walk! stand!* &c., in one sense, convey neither an affirmation nor a denial. Nevertheless they have the essential elements of a proposition, *viz.* a subject, copula, and predicate, (*walk* = *thou be walking.*) Furthermore, they are affirmative, as opposed to negative, and *vice versâ.* The best way, perhaps, is to give to the term proposition a wider sense in Grammar than it receives in Logic.[1] If not,

[1] A Proposition is *judgment expressed in words.* A Proposition is, defined logically, *a sentence indicative, i. e.* affirming or denying. This excludes commands and questions.—WHATELEY. In Philology it is sufficient for the Proposition to contain the three essential ele-

we must look upon imperative and optative verbs as interjections,—verbal in respect to the sense that they convey, but interjectional in respect to the manner of conveying it.

9. *The parts of a Proposition not more than three.*—In all the foregoing examples the number of words used in each affirmative proposition has been neither more nor less than three (*man is mortal*), and in each negative proposition neither more nor less than four (*man is not mortal*). Such examples were chosen solely for the sake of giving the greatest possible clearness to the explanation. It is evident to every one who reflects upon either what he hears or reads, that propositions are in reality much less simple than they have hitherto been described as being. If propositions are so short, how is it that sentences are so long? If subjects and predicates are so simple, how become periods so complex?

The fact is, that both subjects and predicates may be made complex, by the addition of subordinate parts; *e. g.*

The sun (is) shining.

The early sun (is) brightly shining.

The early sun with glad beams (is) brightly shining through the air, &c.

and so on.

Terms like those of the two last examples are called *Mixed Terms.*

The objects also that they express are called objects of *Complex Apprehension,* in opposition to objects of simple apprehension, like *the sun,* &c.

ments of Subject, Copula, and Predicate. In Logic it is necessary that they should be combined so as to form a statement.

The names of objects of complex apprehension (*i. e.* mixed terms) are sometimes called *Many-worded Names.*

Again, one proposition may be subordinate to another, in other words, a whole proposition may enter into the structure of many worded names; *e. g.*

i. The man (is) returning,

ii. Who (was) sent to market.

Combine these, and they form but a single designation, or name. Thus: *the man who was sent to market (is) returning.* The words, *the man who was sent to market,* form but a single name; a many-worded one, doubtless, yet still but a single name.

§ 10. *The parts of a Proposition not fewer than three.*—Although this has already been indicated, and, perhaps, requires no further explanation, it requires being insisted on. Besides this, there are certain apparent contradictions to the fact which require notice.

§ 11. *Apparent Contradictions to the statement, that the parts of a Proposition are no fewer than three.*—These are of two sorts: the first is referable to the practice of language, more or less general; the second to certain apparent properties of the copula.

i. *a.* The predicate and copula may be contained in one word; *e. g.*, instead of saying *fire is burning,* we may say (as we generally do) *fire burns.* In this case, the grammatical form of the proposition does not coincide with the logical form; nevertheless, as it is clear that the shorter and more compendious form is capable of being resolved into the longer one, the statement, that the parts of a proposition are no fewer than three, holds good.

b. The subject and copula may be contained in one word. The Latin proposition *est bonus=he is good,* exemplifies this.

c. The subject, copula, and predicate may be contained in one word, as in the Latin *voco—I call, I am calling.*

ii. Many logicians, both early and late, have considered that, when, the predicate implies simple existence, it is expressed by the copula alone. Whence such expressions as *God is,* are considered to consist of a subject and copula (or copula-predicate) alone.

This error arises from the word *is* being a copula and something more. It superadds, to its power of denoting the agreement or disagreement between the subject and predicate, the notion of existence.

The essentially *relative* character of the copula is a proof of the erroneousness of the view indicated.

The best notion of a copula is to consider it as the equivalent in language to the sign = or (*not equal*) in arithmetic, *i. e.* as a mark indicating the agreement or disagreement between the two terms of the proposition.

Note.—Logicians distribute the negative element in propositions which express denial differently. Some recognize only one form of copula, (*is,*) and combine the negative with the predicate. Thus, the division of the proposition, *Cœsar is not dead,* would not be *Cœsar* (*is not*) *dead,* but *Cœsar* (*is*) *not dead.* (See Mill. vol. i. p. 106.) Nothing is gained by this refinement.

Note.—In many languages the copula is altogether omitted. This is merely one proof out of many that the structure of propositions in Language does not always coincide with the structure of propositions in Logic.

Note.—The sun was shining.—Here the word *was* is in the perfect tense, and expresses time. Now it must be recollected that it does not do so on the strength of its being a copula. The notion of *time*, and the expression of it, is a matter not of Logic but of Grammar. The copula expresses *agreement or disagreement between the subject and predicate* exclusively. Whenever it appears to do more, it is owing to the word used to express it having certain additional powers.

§ 12. *Terms.*—The natural place in a proposition for the copula is the middle. It connects the subject and the predicate, and consequently stands between them.

Hence the subject and the predicate stand at the ends or extremities of propositions, and form its *termini* or boundaries.

This gives origin to the word *Term*. The subject and predicate are the *Terms of a Proposition*.

The natural position of the subject is generally considered to be at the beginning; the natural position of the predicate at the end of the proposition; the copula, as aforesaid, being between them.

And naturally—we think of an object, before we think of its qualities, properties, or attributes.

§ 13. *Logical order of the Parts of Propositions invariable.*—The Logical order of the parts of a proposition are as follows:—1. Subject, 2. Copula, 3. Predicate, &c. This order is invariable.

§ 14. *Grammatical order of the Parts of Propositions variable.*—When we say *great is Diana of the Ephesians*, were verse the order of the subject and redicate. The logical sequence is *Diana of the Ephesians* (*is*) *great.*

§ 15. *Variable and invariable names.*—By contrast-

ing the meaning of such a word as *I*, on the one hand, with such a word as *father*, on the other, we shall perceive the differences between Variable and Invariable Names.

Father is a name denoting any individual that stands in a certain relation to another individual named *son*. The number of such individuals is indefinite. Nevertheless they may be taken as a class, which class is denoted by the general name in question (*father*). This name is invariable, since it cannot be applied to any object not belonging to the class which it denotes.

The word *I*, on the other hand, is a variable name. Its meaning varies with the person in whose mouth it occurs. When *William* says *I*, it means *William;* when *Thomas* says *I*, it means *Thomas*. If a *mother* says *I*, it means a *mother* and a *female;* if a *father* says *I*, it means a *father* and a *male*. Even if an inanimate object be personified and be supposed to speak about itself and to say *I*, it means that inanimate object. It denotes the speaker whoever it may be; but it is not the invariable name of any speaker whatever.

The same reasoning applies to *thou, he, you, &c.*

§ 16. *Substantives.*—An invariable name capable of forming by itself either the subject or the predicate of a proposition is called a Substantive.

§ 17. *Adjectives.* — An invariable name capable of forming by itself, the predicate, but not the subject, of a proposition, is called an Adjective.

Note.—This statement may be refined on. It may be argued, that whenever an adjective stands as a predicate, it does so in appearance only, since a substan-

tive is always implied or understood. Thus, *man* (*is*) *mortal* may be said to signify *man* (*is*) *a mortal being* or *object;* and so on throughout. The author is not aware that any good comes from this refinement upon the current language.

The extent to which substantives may be *understood* has a bearing upon the statements of § 19.

§ 18. *Nouns.*—Substantives and adjectives collectively are called Nouns.

The word *noun* is derived from *nomen* = *a name;* hence, all Nouns are generally considered to be *names.* See § 19, note 2.

§ 19. *Pronouns.*—A variable name, capable of forming by itself either the subject or predicate of a proposition, is called a Pronoun.

Note.—The distinction between certain pronouns and adjectives has yet to be drawn. *What is this,* may be considered to be an elliptical expression; wherein *what* means *what object.* Similarly, *the other is coming* may be expanded into *the other subject of our conversation,* &c. With this view, words like *what, this,* and *the other* are not in the position of words forming *by themselves* subjects, since their presence involves the notion of a substantive *understood.*

Now, whatever may be the validity of this view, words like *I, thou, we,* are not subject to it. Hence, under all views, the existence of pronouns as a true grammatical class of words is undoubted.

Note 2.—Some writers apply the word *name* only to the denotation of *objects,* and that only when its power is invariable, *i. e.* they restrict it to substantives. In this case, not only are adjectives not names, but pro-

nouns are in the same predicament. If this view be held, all that is necessary is slightly to modify the definitions, and to say—

i. Of Adjectives.

A word capable, &c.

ii. Of Pronouns.

A word, not a name, but capable, &c.

§ 20. *Participle.*—An adjective liable to combine with a copula, so as to form, in one word, a predicate and copula at once, is called a Participle.

§ 21. *Verbs.*—A word capable of forming, by itself, both the predicate and the copula of a Proposition, is called a Verb.

The extent to which different languages separate or combine the predicate and copula is very great. We say *it (is) green*, the Latin says *viret*. In certain American dialects, the practice of combining the predicate and copula is so great as to leave few adjectives in the language. In the Cree such predicates and copulas as *is circular, is tall, is short,* are expressed by single words. Hence the language has been said to be *all verb, and no adjective.*

The copula, as a separate element, uncombined with a predicate, has not yet been found to exist in any language; consequently it has not yet been shewn to constitute a separate part of speech. Where the predicate, with which it combines, denotes *existence*, the resulting verb is called a Verb Substantive (*is, est, 'εστι*). It is erroneous to consider this as a simple copula.

§ 22. *Articles.*—The subject of a proposition is, grammatically speaking, of four kinds.

i. *Universal Affirmative.—Man is mortal,* equalling, in meaning, *all men are mortal; every man is mortal.*

ii. *Universal Negative.—No man is mortal.*

iii. *Definite.—The man is mortal; the men are mortal.*

iv. *Indefinite.—A man is mortal; some men are mortal.*

Now, as each of these subjects may be accompanied by a special sign expressive of its character, such a sign must be enumerated amongst the possible parts of speech.

A special sign, however, of the universality of an affirmative subject is either rare or non-existent in language.

A special sign of the universality of a negative subject is *not* rare in language. In English it is the word *no.*

Special signs for the definitude and the indefinitude of a subject are *not* rare in language. In English they are the words *the* and *a* (or *an*) respectively.

When such signs occur they are called Articles.

In order for a word to be an article, it must be incapable of standing in a proposition, *except as the sign of the character of a subject.*

If *the* could be used where *this* or *that* (the words with which it is etymologically connected) can be used, it would be either a noun or pronoun.

If *a* could be used where *one* (the word with which it is etymologically connected) can be used, it would be a noun.

If *no* could be used whenever *not one* can be used, it would be a noun combined with a negation.

But none of the three words can be used, and this

negative character places them in a class by themselves.

Note. 1.—Perhaps this is the first time that the word *no* has been dealt with as an article; nevertheless, its logical relation to the indefinite article and the negative proves its true nature. It is no pronoun according to the definition of a pronoun. If inflected, it would take the inflections of the substantive with which it agreed.

Note. 2.—If a word like *all* or *every*, expressive of universality, were to change its form (as the word *one* has changed its form and become *a*), to become incapable of forming a term (as the word *a* is incapable of forming a term), and finally, to join itself to a noun as a sign of a universal affirmation, a fourth article would be developed. If such is to be developed, the process indicated is the probable mode of its formation.

Caution. In the English language the indefinite article has no plural number. This must not be considered as essential; a multitude of objects may be spoken of with the same indefinitude as a single individual. *Some men*, as compared with *the men*, is an indefinite expression. The limitation of the indefinite article in English, and in many other languages, to the singular number arises from the fact of its having originated in the numeral *one*, rather than a word like *some*.

§ 23. *Negatives.*—A word capable of converting an affirmative into a negative proposition is called a *negative*.

Note.—See § 25. Pure and simple negatives are rarer in language than is imagined. Suppose, instead of the word *not*, we used the word *not at all*. In this

case there would be a negative and something more. There would be the negative itself, and an expression of the extent to which it was a negation. Now, in its origin, history, or etymology, *not* is as mixed a negative as *not at all;* since it grew out of the compound *ne wiht* = *not a whit.* The French negatives are still more compound.

This indicates a distinction between simple negatives and what may be called *modal* negatives, *i. e.* negatives that, over and above the mere expression of disagreement between the predicate and copula, denote also the *manner* in which it takes place. Many negatives which are now simple were originally modal.

§ 24. *Interrogatives.*—A word serving as a sign to denote that a proposition is stated in the form of a question, is called an Interrogative.

True interrogatives are[1] rare in languages; the commoner method consists in transposing the order of the subject and the predicate, or in using some word which has a meaning over and above the mere expression of interrogation.

§ 25. *The parts of speech admissible in perfectly simple Propositions.*—See § 9. If all propositions were perfectly simple, *i. e.* if there were no such things in language as complex terms, the parts of speech just enumerated would comprise all the words admissible into propositions, or, what is the same thing, all the

[1] The nearest approach to a true negative is the Greek *μῶν*. Like the generality, it, however, is, in origin at least, not merely interrogative, but *modal* also. The *μ* is the *μ* in *μη*, and, like our own word *whether*, it involves the additional idea of an alternative, *i. e. whether or not?*

words, with few exceptions, (see § 2, 4, 5, 6, 7,) that constitute language.

But all terms are *not* simple; and the existence in language of complex ones creates the occasion of other classes of words or other parts of speech.

§ 26. *Parts of speech admissible only in complex Propositions.*—The existence of parts of speech, or classes of words, for the admission whereof into language a certain degree of complexity in either the subject or predicate of a proposition is a condition, is involved in the observations of § 23. These parts of speech, or classes of words, are two in number, Adverbs and Prepositions.

§ 27. *Adverbs.*—A word inadmissible in a simple, but admissible in a complex term, and therein requiring the presence of only a single[1] nominal element, is called an Adverb. *John is speaking* loudly. All words that can take the place of *loudly* in a proposition are Adverbs.

§ 28. *Prepositions.*—A word inadmissible into a simple, but admissible into a complex term, and therein requiring the presence of two nominal elements, is called a Preposition. The words *with, from,* are prepositions. Now it is impossible to place such words in a proposition without also having two nominal elements. The fact is, that the preposition connects one noun with another; as, *the son* of *the father, the sun* with *its beams shines* through *the air, &c.*

§ 29. *Parts of speech not entering into the construction of Propositions, but dependent upon the existence of them (i. e. Propositions).*—

Conjunctions.—A part of speech connecting two pro-

[1] Substantives, adjectives, participles, pronouns, and, through their participial elements, verbs, are the *nominal elements.*

positions, but entering into the construction of neither, is called a Conjunction. *The day is bright* because *the sun is shining; the sun shines* and *the moon shines;* or (compendiously) *the sun and moon shine.*

Note.— For the details of the conjunction the reader is referred to Harriss's "Hermes," a book, at present, improperly neglected. Previously to studying the details of this important class of words, he should go one step further in Logic, and familiarise himself not only with the structure of propositions, but of syllogisms. This is necessary in order to understand such words as *illative*, &c.

Note. — Although the statement, that conjunctions connect not *words* but *propositions*, and that exclusively, is nearly coëval with the study of grammar, it is not yet sufficiently either believed or acted on. "What," I have been frequently asked, "are we to do with such expressions as *John and Thomas carry a sack to market, three and three make six?* &c., surely this does not mean that *John carries one sack, and Thomas another*, that *one three makes one sum of six, and a second three another sum of six*, &c."

The answer to this lies in giving the proper limitation to the predicates. It is not true that John and Thomas each *carry a sack;* but it is true that they each *carry*. It is not true that each *three*, in the sentence just quoted, *makes six;* but it is true that each *three makes* (*i. e.* contributes to the making of).

As far, then, as the essential parts of the predicate are concerned, there are two propositions; and it is upon the essential parts only that a grammarian rests his definition of a conjunction.

§ 30. *Parts of speech existing independent of Propositions.—Interjections.*—A part of speech that exists wholly independent of the existence of propositions is called an Interjection.

§ 31. *Parts of speech singly equivalent to Propositions.*— The word *yes* is equivalent to the proposition *it* (*is*) *so*. The word *no* is equivalent to the proposition *it* (*is not*) *so*. Undoubtedly, such words form a separate class. There is, at present, no name for this class.

§ 32. *Recapitulation.*—The parts of speech as follows:—

i. Parts of speech admissible in either simple or complex Propositions, *viz.* Substantive, Adjective, Participle,[1] Pronoun, Verb, Article, Negative, Interrogative.

ii. Parts of speech admissible into complex, but not into simple propositions,—Adverb, Preposition.

iii. Parts of speech not admissible into single propositions at all, but admissible *between* two,—Conjunction.

iv. Parts of speech wholly independent of propositions,—Interjection.

v. Parts of Speech of equal import with Propositions, —words like *yes* and *no*.

§ 33. *Categorematic, Syncategorematic, and Hypercategorematic words.*—A word capable, by itself, of forming a term is called a Categorematic word; from the Greek word *κατηγορεῖν* = *to predicate*, because it can by itself form a predication.

[1] The *Noun* is a *collective* name, and as such omitted. The generalization of our views concerning the parts of speech, and their reduction to nouns alone, to verbs alone, or to nouns and verbs, is no part of the present treatise. The question is to a great extent historical rather than logical.

The categorematic parts of speech are the nouns and pronouns *in their nominative cases.*

A word capable by itself of forming only the part of a term is called a syncategorematic word; the Greek word *συν* signifying *with.* The Syncategorematic parts of speech are the *adverb* and *preposition.*

A word capable by itself of forming a term, and something more than a term, may be called a Hypercategorematic word; the Greek word *ὑπερ* signifying *over, above, over and above.* The verb is hypercategorematic. It forms both a predicate and copula at once. So are words like *yes* and *no.*

Observe, 1.—There is no name compounded of the word *κατηγορεῖν* for conjunctions; and, at present, there is no need to coin one.

Observe, 2.—The word *hypercategorematic* is a new word. The author is sure that its etymology is correct, and believes its introduction to be necessary.

§ 34. It is now necessary to go over the parts of speech a second time, and to consider the words comprehended in each division under a fresh point of view. Hitherto, with the exception of the article, (which it was found convenient to explain on a different principle,) all the parts of speech have been considered in regard to their *position in proposition* exclusively. They must now be considered in respect to *signification of the words* which they comprehend. By so doing, we may discover the reason why certain words have certain places in the propositions where they occur.

§ 35. *Apprehension; Judgment.*—As a preliminary, the following extract from Whateley's "Logic" is useful:

§ 1. "There are three operations (or states) of the

mind which are immediately concerned in argument,—1st, Simple apprehension; 2nd, Judgment; 3rd, Discourse, or Reasoning.

"1st. Simple Apprehension is that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object, and is analogous to the perception of the senses. It is either incomplex or complex. Incomplex apprehension is of one object, or of several without any *relation* being perceived between them, as of '*a man*,' '*a horse*,' '*cards*.' Complex is of several, *with* such a relation, as of '*a man on horseback*,' '*a pack of cards*.'

"2nd. Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions (or ideas) which are the objects of apprehension, whether complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they *agree* or *disagree* with each other (or that one of them *belongs* or *does not belong* to the other); judgment, therefore, is either *affirmative* or *negative*.

"3rd. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of proceeding from one judgment to another *founded* upon that one (or the result of it).

§ 2. "Language affords the *signs* by which these operations of the mind are expressed and communicated. The notion obtained in an act of *apprehension* is called, when expressed in language, a *term*: an act of *judgment* is expressed by a *proposition*, an act of *reasoning* by an *argument* (which when *regularly* expressed is a syllogism), as *e. g.*—

"Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial.

"Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,

"Therefore they are beneficial.

is a syllogism; the act of reasoning being indicated by

the word '*therefore.*' It consists of three *propositions*, each of which has (necessarily) two *terms*, as '*beneficial*,' "'*dispensations of Providence*,' &c. '*afflictions*.'"

Discourse and syllogism are important only in the consideration of conjunctions, a department which, for several reasons, is left by itself, and not treated in the present pages.

§ 36. *Substantives.* — See § 16. Nothing but the name of some object, being, thing, or entity, either really existing or capable of being perceived by the senses or conceived by the imagination, can form the subject of a proposition. This is expressed in the current grammatical definition of a substantive, as the *name of anything we can see, hear, feel, or discourse of* (*i. e. reason about*).

Such an object or entity must either possess or be without certain qualities or attributes; *e. g.* it must either be *white* or *not white.* Hence the name of any quality or attribute of any such object or *entity* may form a predicate; *e. g.*

Snow is white.
Soot is not white.

But we may also predicate of any object or entity, that it may be equal to or identical with another object or entity; *e. g.*

A man is an animal.
A bird is not a quadruped.

This shews that the name of an entity may enter into the structure of a proposition either as subject or as predicate.

See § 19. But, in order to be a substantive, this name must be an invariable or inconvertible one.

A substantive is distinguished from an adjective by its capacity of being at once both predicate and subject; from a pronoun, by the fact of its being an invariable name or designation.

It is a *name;* a name of an object or entity in opposition to the name of an attribute,—an invariable, or inconvertible name, in opposition to a convertible one.

Adjectives.—See § 17. Every object or entity must be endowed with certain qualities or attributes, *e. g. snow is white, man is mortal.*

That the names of such qualities or attributes can become the predicates of propositions, has been shewn above.

That the names of such qualities or attributes cannot be subjects, is clear. We cannot make the subject of our conversation a name that exists only as betokening a quality. We cannot say *white is snow, mortal is man.*

Nothing but the name of either a quality or an entity can be either a subject or a predicate. Nothing but the name of a quality can be a predicate without being a subject also.

See § 17. In order, however, to be an adjective, the name must be an invariable one.

§ 37. *Pronouns.*—The nature of a pronoun has been already explained. In respect to what it denotes it is a noun, substantive or adjective as the case may be. In respect to its manner of denoting it it is peculiar, being variable, whereas substantives and adjectives are invariable.

Thus, the substantive *snow* takes its name from qualities which it possesses, and through the effect of which it becomes cognizable to our senses or imagination, *e. g.*

it is cold (*i. e.* has the quality of coldness), *it is white* (*i. e.* has the quality of whiteness), &c. Now these qualities, or their equivalents, are constant, fixed, and invariable. What *particular* quality or qualities shall determine the name of an object or entity, is not always certain; but it is always certain that that quality, whatever it be, be constant to, and inherent in the object.

In like manner, the adjective *white* means some fixed inherent quality of some object or entity. The particular class of objects or entities to which it applies is not always certain; but it is always certain that it is the name of a constant quality.

The character of words like *snow* and *white* is determined by the nature of the objects to which they are applied.

Hence a contrast between nouns and pronouns. The character of words like *this, that, the same, I, thou, he,* &c., is determined by the relation of the object or entity spoken of to something else. Hence the meaning of a pronoun as a name varies with the variable *relations* of the object to which it is applied; whilst the meaning of nouns expresses the *constant* characteristics of the objects to which it is applied. Nouns are absolute names, pronouns relative.

Relation, however, is an attribute or quality. Hence, in one sense, pronouns are, like nouns, names either of an attribute, or given on account of an attribute.

§ 38. *Participles.*—See § 18. Every quality or attribute implies one of two things on the side of the subject. It implies either a state; as *grass is green, i. e.* in a state of greenness: or else an action; as *snow is falling, i. e.* in the act of falling—or, taking the propo-

sition negatively, *grass is not green, snow is not falling*. Furthermore, every name of an attribute or quality is an adjective.

Now it has been seen, that although the copula and predicate are, in Logic, separate elements of the proposition, they may, in Grammar, coalesce. And it must further be remarked, that the tendency between the copula and predicate to coalesce, is different for the two different kinds of qualities or attributes.

i. With predicates expressive of a state, the coalition is, comparatively speaking, rare.

ii. With predicates expressive of an action, the coalition is well-nigh[1] universal.

§ 39. *Verb.*—See § 19. A verb is a name for all simple words capable of expressing the existence or non-existence of a state or of an action; and it signifies either *to be something* or *to do something*.

Nothing but a word of this kind can be at once predicate and copula. The predicate-element denotes the particular state or action; the copula-element, its existence or non-existence, or, to speak more generally, its applicability or non-applicability to the subject.

The predicate-element of a verb may also be called the nominal-element, since all predicates are nouns.

§ 40. *Article, Negative, Interrogative.*— See §§ 21, 22, 24.

[1] The word *liable* in § 18 is undoubtedly unscientific. Nevertheless, the word *capable* would not have done instead. *All* adjectives are capable of becoming parts of verbs. The extent of their liability is determined by the habit of particular languages.

§ 41. *Adverbs.*— In order for a proposition to be simple, its terms must be simple.

The substantive or pronoun forming one of them must be the name of an object of incomplex apprehension.

The adjective, or participle that very often forms one, must also be simple.

Finally, the verb, if it stand instead of a participle and copula, must be simple also.

This limits the parts of speech admissible into simple propositions, and introduces the question as to the manner in which propositions become complex.

The copula is essentially simple, so that whatever complexity occurs in propositions occurs in the *terms.* Whenever it is a verb by which complexity is given to a proposition, it is done on the strength of its predicate-element exclusively.

Now, the only sorts of words which can be admitted into complex terms are words which either express, 1st, the relation that *two* nouns bear to one another, or, 2ndly, the mode (or manner) in which states or actions take place.

And it follows from hence, that the only words admissible into a term where there is but one noun (or nominal element) must be a word expressive of the mode (or manner) of a state or action. Words of this kind are called adverbs; because the predicate with which they combine generally coalesces with the copula, and becomes a verb.

§ 42. *Prepositions.*— The only word coming under the conditions of § 26 must be a word denoting the relation that one noun in a term bears to another.

Obs.—Every preposition governs a case. This follows necessarily, inasmuch as prepositions shew the relationship between *two* nouns—*I go out of the house.*

When a word originally a preposition connects itself with a verb, and simply indicates the manner in which an action takes place, it has become converted from a preposition into an adverb, as *I go up* = *ἀναβαίνω.* Hence all prepositions in composition become adverbalized.

§ 43. *Conjunctions.*—The only class of words coming under the conditions of § 27 must be a word denoting the relation that one proposition bears to another.

Note.—By exhausting the different modes by which one proposition may be joined to another, we may determine, *à priori*, the number and character of all possible conjunctions. From its connection with the syntax of the subjunctive mood, from the fact of its investigation involving the construction, not only of propositions, but of syllogisms also, and, lastly, from the extent to which proper logicians have explained the nature of conjunctions, the present remarks are limited.

Note.—No conjunction can govern a case. Conjunctions connect propositions, and they can only do this by connecting subjects. These must necessarily be nominatives. On the other hand, conjunctions may be said to govern moods; since they shew the extent to which the copula of one proposition depends upon that of another,—*if we walk too far, we shall be tired.* When a conjunction is followed by a case, it becomes a preposition.

All fled but he.—Here the word *but* is a conjunction,

and the propositions are two in number: 1. *All fled;* 2. *but he did not fly.*

All fled but him. — Here the word *but* is a preposition, meaning *except*, and the proposition is single.

The remaining parts of speech require no further notice.

§ 44. *Logical and Grammatical elements of a Proposition.* — The Logical elements of a proposition have been examined. With these the Grammatical elements may or may not coincide. They rarely do so altogether.

The most important difference takes place in one of the five following ways:—

i. The grammatical expression may be more compendious than the logical one. In this way we get the copula and predicate combined in a single word; or (changing the expression) a verb instead of a participle and copula. *Fire burns* = *fire is burning.*

ii. Grammar may express not only the logical elements of a proposition, but something besides them. Thus, the sign of gender and number expressed in the declension of nouns, and the signs of time expressed in the tenses of verbs, are extra-logical elements of propositions.

iii. Grammar may employ certain forms for the sake of shewing the relationship that certain words bear to each other, *independent of any idea of substitution.* The sign of the nominative case, where it exists, exists as a mark of distinction, not as the equivalent of any of the logical elements of a proposition. This is not the case with the *-o* in *voco* = *I call.* The *-o* in *voco* stands as the representative of the subject, *I*, and as its substitute. See §§ 45, 46.

Where an inflexion stands as the equivalent of a logical element, the practice of Grammar and the forms of Logic differ in degree only, not in kind.

iv. *Excess of Expression.*—In the word *call-est*, the *-est* is the sign of the second person. As such it is an equivalent to the personal pronoun *thou*, the logical subject. Nevertheless, we say not simply *call-est*, but *thou call-est*, so using both pronoun and the substitute at the same time. This is an instance of what may be called *excess of expression*.

§ 45. Some of the previous remarks shew that some inflexions are more closely connected with the structure of propositions than others. The signs of mood are more a matter of Logic than the signs of gender.

The only inflexions that, in so short a treatise as the present, require particular notice, are *a*. The persons of verbs; *b*. Certain cases.

§ 46. *The Persons of Verbs.*—An inflexion that expresses a subject is called a Person. In the Latin language the combination *v, o, c*, means *call*. In the same language,

Voc-*o* = *I* call.
Voc-*as* = *thou* call-*est*.
Voc-*at* = *He* call-*s*.
Voc-*amus* = *We* call.
Voc-*atis* = *ye* call.
Voc-*ant* = *They* call.

In all these examples the terminations *-o, -as, -at*, &c., serve instead of the pronouns *I, thou, he*, &c., which are not necessary to the construction.

This inflexion is pre-eminently logical, inasmuch as

the grammatical element *-o*, &c., stands as an equivalent to the logical element called the subject.

§ 47. *Certain oblique cases.*—Modifications in the form of a noun, that are equivalent to the introduction of a preposition, always constitute a *case-inflection*, or, simply, a case. Case-inflections shew the relation that one noun bears to another; and this is precisely what is done by prepositions. Thus, *the father-s son = the son of the father;* in other words, the inflexion *-s* is equivalent to the preposition *of*.

Hence whatever inflexion takes the place of a preposition, is called a Case. The genitive, dative, ablative, instrumental, and some other rarer cases, are of this kind. The nominative, vocative, and accusative cases are not so. That this difference between what may be called the prepositional and the non-prepositional cases is a real one, is shewn by the greater extent to which the genitive and dative cases retain their signs, throughout the changes of language, as compared with the nominative, vocative, and accusative.

Note.—The subject of a proposition is necessarily a nominative case.

Note.—Many inflexions represent (perhaps are) single words. Thus, the *-o* in *voc-o*, or the *-s* in *father-s*, may once have been separate words, which afterwards coalesced with the respective crude forms *voc* and *father*. This is a fact which *accounts* for the difference between the logic and the grammar of a proposition, not one which denies its existence. However much the *-s* in *father* may have been a true preposition at one time, it is not so now. Similarly, what was once a preposition may at an earlier period still have been a noun. The philology

which reduces all parts of speech to the noun and verb, however true in history, is false in logic.

§ 48. Other points of grammar, besides these, are connected with Logic, and are best understood by the logician. Such are, more especially, the definition of proper names, the difference between the abstract and the concrete, the principle that determines names, the nature of moods, the rationale of the concords, the affinity of ideas by which the meanings of words change and become ambiguous, and, lastly, the whole doctrine of moods as connected with the government of conjunctions. The present points, however, are thought sufficient for an introduction to the subject.

WORKS

BY

R. G. LATHAM, M.A.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. 8vo. cloth, 12*s.*

"It is, in truth, a most learned and laborious inquiry into some of the more abstruse points in general Grammar, and in that of the English language in particular, commencing with its historical descent and connexions, and including the causes of many of its peculiarities of structure and condition. By the word Grammar, in ordinary parlance, is understood a number of rules; whereas the work before us, so far as it has attained to the character of a well-ordered design, is a repertory of the reasons which are at the bottom of the rules."—*Athenæum.*

AN ELEMENTARY ENGLISH GRAMMAR. For the Use of Schools. SECOND EDITION, 12mo. 4*s.* 6*d.* cloth.

"His comparison of the old Saxon forms with the modern English, his classification of verbs under the heads of weak and strong forms, and his remarks on the derivation and construction of English words, afford evidence of laborious investigation and research, and are a valuable contribution towards reducing our language within its proper limits."—*Classical Museum.*

FIRST OUTLINES OF LOGIC APPLIED TO GRAMMAR AND ETYMOLOGY. 12mo.

QUESTIONS ON DR. LATHAM'S ELEMENTARY ENGLISH GRAMMAR, with an Index of Reference. BY HENRY GREEN, M. A. 12mo. 1*s.* 6*d.* cloth.

TAYLOR AND WALTON, 28, UPPER GOWER STREET.

NEW HISTORY OF ROME,

FOR COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS.

A HISTORY OF ROME, from the Earliest Times to the Death of Commodus, A.D. 192. By Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, F.R.S.E., Rector of the High School of Edinburgh. One thick vol. 12mo. 7*s.* 6*d.* cloth; or 8*s.* 6*d.* strongly bound in leather.

*** This Work presents, in a popular form, the results of the investigations of the most distinguished scholars, especially those of Niebuhr, Arnold, Goettling, Rubino, and Becker. The whole is based upon a careful examination of the original sources.

(*From the Preface.*)

"The object which the author of the present undertaking has kept in view, was to produce a book which should place the 'History of Rome' before the young student in a manner worthy of, and consistent with, the progress which has been made in this branch of our historical knowledge. Whether he has been successful in his attempt, he must leave others to judge. It should, however, be borne in mind, that to condense and to select out of an immense mass of detail that which is really necessary to give a vivid picture of any period in history, is often far more difficult than to give a minute narrative of all the particulars recorded in the authorities. In conformity with the principle above laid down, he has stated as facts those points which are now acknowledged by all competent judges to be facts, though in older books they are either not mentioned at all or are placed in a wrong light. Among them he may mention the nature of the plebeians, and their relation to the patricians, which render the history of the long-protracted struggle between the two orders so instructive and interesting; the character of the ager publicus, and of the agrarian laws; for these are no longer the opinions of this or that scholar, but facts established as firmly as any others in history. Those points, on the other hand, which are still matters of uncertainty or dispute, have, when necessary, been stated as such, or passed over altogether, in order not to confuse the learner."

QUESTIONS ON DR. SCHMITZ'S HISTORY OF ROME. By John Robson, B.A. 12mo.

TAYLOR AND WALTON, 28, UPPER GOWER STREET.

RETURN TO the circulation desk of any
University of California Library

or to the

NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS

- 2-month loans may be renewed by calling (510) 642-6753
- 1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books to NRLF
- Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date

Due Date:
DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

NOV 1 8 2004

DD20 6M 9-03

YA 00304

ises in Logic; designed for the Use of Students in Colleges. By J. T. Gray, Ph.D. 12mo. *Price* 3s. 6d. *cloth.*

vork, besides the exercises, contains an exposition of the principles nolastic Logic. Its peculiarity consists in copiously illustrating part of the subject by examples, given after each chapter, and, in rm of recapitulary exercises after each section It may be called a *ical Logic*, the principles, as soon as learned, being impressed on the by numerous familiar instances of their application. At each step progress, the student is required to state how the examples placed him illustrate or violate the rules and formulæ of right reasoning.

---

nal Logic; or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and rob Augustus De Morgan, Professor of Ma-

890
6778 E352
f
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

n Appendix is
nst him by Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh.

Collection of Poetry for the Practice of Elocution, made for use of the Ladies' College. By F. W. Newman, Professor of atin in University College, London. Fcap. 8vo. *Cloth* 2s. 6d.

selection of poetry has been made simply with a view to facility of tion. The various pieces are selected chiefly from modern authors; ollection is therefore, to a great extent, novel.